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ABSTRACT 
 This research examines how the act of administrating altruistic punishment is impacted by 
group identity and variability in contributions to a public good settings.  The decision to punish 
low contributors involves a cost to the punisher and carries no individual benefit for the action; 
as such it is an altruistic act. Altruistic punishment is unique because there is not materialistic, 
rational reasons to employ it, yet we know it is used. Consequently, such punishment is used to 
uphold norms of exacting revenge. I proposed a six condition experimental study in which I 
manipulated three factors of group identity (in-group, out-group, and no group identity) and two 
types of variability in contributions (high and low). I posited that there would be differences in 
the frequency in decisions to administer altruistic punishment to a non-contributor depending on 
the combinations of group identity and variance in contributions. Results indicated that these 
factors were not significant in determining the frequency of utilizing altruistic punishment. The 
administration of altruistic punishment was significantly related to the level of contribution to the 
public good. Individuals who contributed more to the public good also administered more 
altruistic punishment. Sex and variability in contribution were both found to be significant in 
influencing contributions. Men contributed more and participants in the low variability condition 
contributed more respectfully. The relationship between sex and altruistic punishment is 
completely mediated by amount of contributions. While there is a clear and significant 
relationship between contribution variance and contributions, as well as between contributions 
and punishment, contributions do not mediate the relationship between contribution variance and 
punishment because the relationship between contribution and punishment is not significant. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
  Public goods are a type of social dilemma that require individuals to face the conflict 
between individual short-term incentives and overall group incentives (Dawes 1980). Public 
goods are communal resources and are characterized by non-excludability. Non-excludability 
means individuals involved in this decision will receive a portion of the public good regardless 
of their contribution to the good. However, the problem or dilemma is that if all individuals 
decide to not contribute, the public good cannot be sustained and everyone is worse off than if 
they all had contributed to the fullest.  Common examples of public goods are public radio, 
public parks, and public education. 
    There are different mechanisms that help group members sustain public goods in the 
face of the temptation to partake but not contribute to the public goods.  I am particularly 
interested in how punishment or the threat of punishment, might prompt group members to 
sustain public goods.  It has been consistently demonstrated that, under certain conditions, 
punishment does help develop and sustain cooperation.  In such cases, one person may have to 
“step forward” for the good of the group.  Although sometimes the administering of punishment 
may be justifiable in terms of individual reward to the punisher, the focus of this study is on the 
more curious case of altruistic punishment, the case in which the punisher receives no direct 
benefits from the punishment of another, and in fact has to sacrifice in order to punish. 
    This research examines how the act of administering altruistic punishment is impacted 
by group identity and variability in contributions to a public good. The decision to punish low 
contributors involves a cost to the punisher and carries no individual benefit for the action; as 
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such it can be described as an altruistic act. Altruistic punishment is unique because while there 
is no materialistic, rational reason to employ it, we know it is used. Consequently, such 
punishment is used either to uphold norms or exact revenge (or both). I propose a six condition 
experimental study in which I manipulate three levels of group identity (no group identity, in-
group identity, and out-group identity) and two types of variability in contributions (high 
variability and low variability). I posit that there will be differences in decisions to administer 
altruistic punishment to a non-contributor depending on the combinations of group identity and 
variability in contributions. 
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2. PUNISHMENT 
    Punishment is a diverse concept that is studied across multiple social science 
disciplines. Because of its diversity in conceptualization, each discipline approaches the idea 
with a different point of emphasis. The concept can also be conceptualized in terms a micro-
macro spectrum of focusing on punishment from an individualist approach or from a more 
societal approach.  
2.1 Micro-level Perspective 
    A micro approach towards punishment focuses on how individual behaviors can be 
shaped or controlled through the learned association between anticipated stimuli of punishment 
and reward and behaviors. A psychological approach towards punishment is most often 
connected to the behavioral branch of the discipline and specifically to theories of learning such 
as operant conditioning. If a factor has decreased the occurrence of a behavior in the past, it is 
conceptualized as a punishment (see Molm, 1990 & 1994). This theoretical approach to 
punishment is anchored by the work of Skinner (1953), who emphasized punishments (and 
reinforcements) as important forms of situational feedback that promote learning and enhanced 
performance. By administering punishment, individual behaviors can be manipulated and 
restructured to decrease the frequency and occurrence of behaviors that are viewed as 
undesirable. This view of punishment focuses on its ability to alter or change the behavior of the 
individual who receives the punishment. As with most areas of study within psychology, 
punishment is addressed at the micro-level of how an individual’s immediate behavior is altered 
in relation to the administration of punishment.  
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    In this behavioral psychological perspective, the costs associated with administering or 
receiving punishment are not prioritized as a major area of emphasis. The attention within the 
perspective is placed on the impact of the punishment in creating change, largely benefiting the 
person or group being punished. Specifically, this fits within the theoretical perspective of 
Behaviorism, which describes and explains learning and behaviors in terms of stimulus response 
relationships. There is less concern with the relationship between the societal parameters and 
relationship involving the individual administering the punishment and the individual receiving 
the punishment. Additionally, this perspective does not emphasize cognitive aspects involved in 
the administration of punishment such as strategic motives including reputations, cost of 
punishment, threats of counter punishment, and effectiveness of punishment.  
2.2 Macro-level Perspective 
    While Psychology takes a micro-level approach to the impact of punishment on an 
individual’s behavior, Criminology takes a macro-level approach to punishment as a societal 
mechanism for control. Criminology focuses on how societies establish and maintain 
mechanisms of punishment to keep order and control over large groups of people living within a 
society. In contrast to Psychology, Criminology is not as concerned with the individual change in 
behaviors that come from the administration of punishment that fall outside the realm of criminal 
actions. Instead, Criminology is more generally concerned with how punishment is utilized as a 
societal tool to maintain control over large groups of individuals. From a Criminological 
perspective, Garland (2012) discusses punishment as a sanctioning mechanism that demonstrates 
disapproval in the actions of interacting individuals within a societal institution. This definition 
emphasizes the societal institution as the source that administers the punishment. Punishment is 
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often discussed in terms of rules, laws, or customs that are either implicitly or explicitly 
expressed, and expected to be upheld by all individuals within that societal institution. Instead of 
focusing on individual behavioral change, punishment is viewed as a societal instrument to 
enforce dominant group standards and maintain institutionally established order. Punishment is 
seen as an element of behavioral change but moreso emphasized as an element of social control. 
Punishment is used to maintain the societal status quo in terms of formal and informal 
mechanisms of control. Formal mechanisms consist of imprisonment, fines, and capital 
punishment for the violation of established laws. Informal mechanisms consist of stigmatization, 
ostracism, and chastising that can occur in congruence with formal punishments or occur 
separately for the violation of cultural standards. Both mechanisms serve to deter behaviors that 
are counter to the established rules of a society and to sanction individuals who do not comply to 
those rules. In the case of societal control, punishment can be conceptualized as a process that 
can be applied, but also can be used as a threat if certain behaviors persist. Both threats of and 
actual punishments represent societal disapproval for established societal standards. 
    One of the most extreme components of societal sanctioning is capital punishment; 
termination of life for individuals who commit certain actions. The termination of life removes 
all chances of behaviors being altered and instead institutes a sanction eliminating all future 
behaviors.  This fully demonstrates the conceptualization of punishment as a sanctioning tool 
instead of a tool for behavioral modification as described in Psychology. Punishment allows 
societies to fully signify disapproval towards individuals violating social rules of conduct and as 
the administration of these sanctions is publicized, the attention to the sanctions serves as a form 
of general deterrence for other individuals from repeating offenses in the future. This 
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conceptualization of punishment demonstrates sanctioning on a macro-level; it addresses how 
societal institutions are maintained and function in terms of dealing with interactions within the 
society.  
    The micro-level approach to punishment taken by Psychology and the macro-level 
approach to punishment taken by Criminology are on two opposite ends of a spectrum regarding 
the conceptualization of punishment.  However, there are similarities. Similar to Psychology, 
Criminology generally does not address the social dynamic that occurs between the individual 
administering the punishment and the individual receiving the punishment. This is in accordance 
to a macro-level approach where specific individuals are not directly responsible for the 
administration of punishment, but rather centralized sanctioning institutions are responsible, 
giving power and authority to the criminal justice system. These centralized authorities represent 
and uphold the general attitude of members of society who disapprove of the behavior that 
results in sanctioning. In addition to a detachment from individual connections between the 
punisher and the punished, Criminology like Psychology give little attention to aspects such as 
reputations, cost of punishment, threats of counter punishment, and effectiveness of punishment.  
2.3 Meso-level Perspective 
    While Psychology and Criminology conceptualize and study punishment from two 
different extremes (micro-macro), Economics and Sociology address many of the societal 
aspects that lay between them and represent a meso-level approach towards punishment.  
Economics focuses on punishment in terms of how individuals think about the impact that 
sanctioning will produce. Punishment is seen as one outcome component within a calculated 
decision to perform a sanctioning behavior.  Economic perspectives equate punishments with the 
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costs imposed to perform a behavior and can be represented, similar to Criminology, by formal 
sanctions (fines or restrictions of monetary value) and informal sanctions (peer pressure, gossip, 
or social ostracism) (Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964). An economic approach to punishment focuses 
on the calculated costs-benefit analysis that results in decisions to administer a sanction. This is 
supported by the premise that tactical, rational calculations largely influence and shape all 
actions, including punishment. Rapoport (1967) describes punishment in social situations as 
being part of the outcome structure, where the costs associated with the outcome of actions and 
decisions determine the behavior in any given situation. To this accord, punishment is 
conceptualized as an outcome that is reached in a decision making process, where an individual 
focuses on the future. The decision making process is complex and individuals must take 
multiple variables into account before a decision can be made.  Punishments would only be 
administered if the benefits outweigh the costs.  This economic perspective generally assumes 
that actors make rational choices to maximize personal resources or benefits.  
    Strategic game theory, usually considered as part of the economic perspective, 
conceptualizes costs and benefits, but also considers what others’ in the situation might do in 
future interactions.  The decision maker takes into consideration numerous situational factors 
such as chances of counter-punishment, necessity of absorbing the cost of administration 
individually versus letting someone else absorb the cost, effectiveness of punishment impacting 
change in the individual who is punished, chances of future interactions with the person targeted, 
opportunities to benefit through future interactions involving future contributions, and how the 
action of punishing will be perceived by others outside and inside the group. This represents a 
meso-level approach explicitly illustrating the complex and dynamic strategic process of 
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determining whether to administer punishment, while still structuring the decision in terms of a 
rational choice to maximize individual benefits and focus on the future. 
    Similar to strategic game theory, sociological perspectives focus on the social networks 
involved when administering punishment. A prominent set of research theories and findings 
associated with punishment are those of Molm and colleagues.  Through her research Molm 
(1988, 1990) compared reward-based power with punishment-based power and showed that 
when both are presented as possible tools of promoting cooperation within social exchanges, 
punishment was weakly used in comparison to rewards. In further research, Molm demonstrated 
that although actors dislike using punishment, when it is used frequently and consistently, it 
produces the highest frequency of rewarding exchanges between actors and created the least 
negative affect towards actors in exchange (Molm 1994).  Molm discusses the use of punishment 
in terms of ‘punishment power’ indicating that within exchanges punishment can be utilized as 
an expression of power that an individual can exert over another if they feel that there is an 
imbalance within the exchange. In this way, punishment is a mechanism that is utilized to create 
a more balanced exchange among group members in future exchanges. Molm discusses the idea 
that once punishment power is used, the power involving threat within future exchange is 
diminished because the sanction is already implemented. Molm’s focus on the frequency and 
strength of punishment being vital to rewarding exchanges between actors is extremely important 
for many different kinds of interactions. 
    These diverse approaches to the understanding of punishment can be conceptualized 
based on where along the micro-macro perspective the disciplines emphasizes. The focus may be 
on the micro-level, singular interaction occurring, the larger, macro-level, societal mechanism 
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involved, or the mixed, meso-level, combination of both. I suggest that investigating punishment 
from a Structural Social Psychological approach might help to bridge the conceptualizations 
being  considered. Structural Social Psychology is a sociological approach to studying social 
psychology that emphasizes the interconnection between the micro and macro-levels of 
interactions. Structural Social Psychology stresses that macro-level, societal elements (such as 
group norms based on identity) impact micro-level personal interactions (such as contributing to 
a public good) while at the same time micro-level, interaction specific elements (such as 
variations in contributions) impact macro-level societal elements (such as the development of 
group norms). 
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3. PUBLIC GOODS 
    As mentioned, public goods are social dilemmas because they are non-excludable. 
Non-excludability creates the incentive issue of whether individuals should contribute to the 
resource or to defer from contributing and ‘free-ride’ off the contributions of others. If we would 
assume an actor is perfectly rational and cares only about maximizing their own resources, free 
riding would be the rule; however, research has not supported this proposition (Alfano & 
Marwell 1980; Brubaker 1975; Isaac, McCue & Plott 1985; Isaac & Walker 1988; Isaac, Walker 
& Thomas 1984; Marwell & Ames 1979,1980,1981; Schneider & Pommerehne 1981; Bowles & 
Gintis, 2004; Nowak, 2006).   
3.1 Factors that Influence Contributions to Public Goods 
     There are a host of factors that can influence when and how group members contribute 
to public goods. Some of the most prominent factors include payoff properties, one-time vs. 
repeated interactions, and information that is transmitted among group members (such as group 
identity). While all of these factors have been shown to impact contributions to public goods, no 
factor operates in isolation. An important component of this research is examining the impact of 
multiple factors in combination in terms of influencing contributions to public goods.  
    Contributions are affected by payoff properties; when the benefits for contributing 
decrease, contributions also decrease.  Additionally, there are large theoretical and empirical 
differences between the setting in which participants making repeated decisions versus one-time 
decisions (see Sell and Reese 2014). One-time decisions do not provide an opportunity for 
rewarding or punishing other actors in a manner that will provide a direct selfish benefit (Sell 
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and Wilson, 1999; Carlen, 2014).  When interactions are repeated, there are a number of different 
means by which interactions can be sustained.  This theoretical idea is sustained through the 
famous Folk Theorem.  This theorem states that when interactions are repeated for sufficiently 
long periods of time, there are different kinds of mechanisms that can sustain interactions.  In 
other words, as the horizon for the time of interaction in a public good with a group extends over 
time, the rational calculation of actions adjusts to make cooperation an appropriate option for 
maximum individual benefit. The Folk theorem only demonstrates that cooperation is possible to 
sustain, even when only motivated by self interest. It does not allow us to determine what 
mechanism, among an infinite number, might be used (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). 
    Research by Sell and Wilson (1991) demonstrates that an important factor that 
influences contributions is what group members know about each other and how information is 
transmitted. When actors have more information about each group member’s individual 
contribution and when they know that others have this information as well, contributions 
increase.  
    Importantly for my formulation, group identity, as a specific form of information, 
influences contributions, with individuals contributing more when they share a group 
membership characteristics (Yamagishi, Jin, and Miller, 1998; Yamagishi, et al., 2005; Brewer & 
Kramer, 1986; DeCremer & van Vugt, 1998; Jackson, 2008; Utz, 2004). However, different 
identities have different effects. One way this is demonstrated is by the fact that status 
characteristics can be seen as a group identity. When activated, they influence behaviors among 
group members based on stereotypes associated with those characteristics. An example of this 
can be seen when men interacting with men, contributions to a public good are at lower levels 
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compared to men interacting with women.  In other words, the stereotypes of gender 
expectations that the person has of themselves and their other group members to contribute are 
activated based on status characteristics, impacting decisions to contribute (Sell, Griffith, and 
Wilson, 1993 and Sell 1997).   
In addition, this research showed how gender specifically could operate differently in 
public goods contexts. They find gender differences do not emerge when group members know 
the gender of the other group members, but do not receive contribution feedback. However, if 
group members receive information about each others’ contributions, gender effects emerge 
along stereotypical lines: both men and women contribute less to men than they do to women.  
Gender has the dichotomous distinction of having the potential for being a strong identity and 
also a salient diffuse status characteristic (Sell and Kuipers, 2009). It’s impact on decision 
making may be influential in impacting contribution decision based on  
    Sell and Love (2009) argue that identities impact behaviors because shared group 
identities activate a sense of ‘common fate’ among group members. Shared identities lead 
individuals to contribute more to a public good because individuals feel that the outcome or ‘fate’ 
of the group will have the same impacts on all group members who are similar. While ‘common 
fate’ can provide a partial explanation for the impact of identity on decision making behaviors in 
group settings, it is not the only factor. Group identity can also activate stereotypes if the 
identities are tied to status characteristics that delineate group members and impact expectations 
of group members. These stereotypical expectations have been seen to directly to influence 
decision to contribute to a public good (Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Simpson, McGrimmon, & Irwin, 
2007).  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3.2 Punishment within Public Goods 
    With a public good, individuals face the dilemma of either contributing to the public 
good that can benefit a group or free riding on the contributions of others and not contributing. 
Research has demonstrated that, under certain conditions, people are willing to contribute to 
public goods and one way that cooperation can be maintained is when punishment of non-
contributors is a viable option (Fehr and Gachter, 2000).  
    Sanctioning and punishment in public goods have received increased attention from 
researchers. Punishment has been investigated as a mechanism to effect change and as 
mechanism to exact revenge or to uphold a particular norm. Empirically these two types of 
punishment can be separated by whether or not future interaction is anticipated. This 
methodological difference allows researchers to differentiate between punishment as a 
mechanism of adjustment that can alter and shape behaviors within a current social dilemma or a 
mechanism activated purely as a sanctioning tool without impact on altering behaviors within a 
current situation. This latter conceptualization of punishment is often discussed as altruistic 
punishment as there are no economic or social benefits from the punishment, and the punishment 
is seen more as an attempt to regulate future social interactions involving other people rather 
than the immediate situation at hand or simply as revenge.  
3.3 Punishment in Repeated Settings     
    An important area of emphasis is how information impacts decisions to administer 
punishment. For example, Sell and Wilson (1999) demonstrate that when individuals are 
interacting for a series of decisions and if they know that defection by one group member will 
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result in a trigger or defection by all, cooperation increases.  Furthermore, it increases the longer 
the group anticipates interacting. 
    Fehr and Gachter (2000, 2002) demonstrate that if punishment is a viable option in 
ongoing public goods social dilemmas, cooperation increases and when punishment is removed 
as an option, cooperation decreases. This research helps demonstrate punishment as a tool to 
monitor and regulate behaviors of individuals in social dilemmas. An important methodological 
result from this research showed that cooperation fluctuates based on whether sanctioning is 
added or removed. 
    Punishment within repeated group interactions has been tied to numerous individual 
incentives such as gaining a reputation or status. Gaining a reputation as a punisher is usually 
seen as a benefit to a group in terms of decreasing free-riding.  Brandt, Hauert, Sigmund (2003) 
investigate punishment and reputations in public goods involving spatial settings and state that 
cooperation is boosted when group members have localized interactions, punishments are 
directed against free-riders, and reputations are formed to unmask non-punishers.  Their findings 
suggest that if individuals are aware of the location of their group members, can trace defection 
to the perpetrators and have awareness of individual reputations, cooperation is much more 
easily achieved.        
    Research by dos Santos, Rankin, Wedekind (2011, 2013) discuss the implication that 
long-term benefits for administering punishment can stem from gaining a reputation for being 
willing to punish non-contributors. One gain that is seen is that the punisher is more likely to 
receive help in future interactions from individuals who know of their reputation. Shared 
knowledge about who is willing to contribute to a public good is the first component of 
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beneficial reputations and  information about contributing by punishing free-riders also serves to 
create positive reputations.  Research by Fessler & Haley, (2003) and Barclay, (2006) suggests 
that when punishing a free rider provides increased overall gains for a group, it signals the 
punisher’s commitment to the group by being willing to sacrifice for the betterment and 
prosperity of the group. It also demonstrates concern with fairness in terms of not allowing 
individuals to benefit unfairly off of others contributions and unwillingness to tolerate being 
cheated. All of these scenarios complied lead to the idea that people trust punishers more than 
non-punishers, and that trust stemming from the reputation of being a punisher can be transferred 
to direct, individual benefits for the punisher based on the reputation gained from administering 
punishment.   
    When groups anticipate interacting for short periods of time, the cost of altruistic 
punishment increases. The cost of altruistic punishment is only worth absorbing if the impact of 
the punishment leads to increased cooperation by individuals once they are sanctioned. When 
group interact for short periods of time the likelihood of receiving an individual positive impact 
in terms of change in behavior of non-contributors diminishes. This increases the cost of putting 
resources towards sanctioning, as the chance to recoup the loses paid towards sanctioning 
decreases as interactions decrease.  Stated another way, as the possibility of producing 
cooperation through altering non-cooperative behavior that is profitable to all decreases, the cost 
of punishment increases due to the increased likelihood of free-riding regardless of sanctioning. 
3.4 Punishment as a Secondary Contribution to a Public Good 
    Some researchers (see Fehr and Gachter, 2002 and Heckathorn, 1989 for example) 
define first and second order contribution problems associated with public goods.  The first order 
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is the contribution decision itself.  The second order is the decision to sustain, encourage, or 
punish others.  This is due to the fact that everyone involved in the group will be better off if free 
riding is deterred, but no one has an incentive to punish free riders, if punishment is costly. 
Another example of second order contributions consistent with other-based preferences has been 
discussed in the reputation maintenance through reputation systems (Simpson and Willer, 2015). 
Maintaining reputations could be considered a secondary contribution to a public good because 
research has shown that people readily share information about prior exchange partners via 
gossip, even suffering costs to do so, when the spreading of reputational information could 
protect others from exploitation (Feinberg, et al., 2014).  
    Research on punishment has also examined how individuals perceive others who 
punish non-contributors and those who chose not to punish non-contributors. Kamei & 
Putterman (2012) and Dickson et al. (2013) conducted public goods experiments with 
participants able to punish other group members.  Similar to previous studies, these researchers 
found that when group members could see the history of who punished whom, punishment 
increased cooperation. However, when participants were only informed who previously punished 
them only and could not see past decisions, cooperation did not increase.  This demonstrates that 
the ability to monitor the actions of others is important for the positive effects of punishment on 
cooperation.  Such findings demonstrate that the relationship between punisher and punished are 
important in first and second order public good decisions.  
3.5 Altruistic Punishment in Public Goods Settings 
    Altruistic punishment can be investigated by considering settings in which punishment 
is costly to the punisher and the punisher is not expecting personal gain in terms of reputation, 
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reciprocity, and expectation of future interaction. In other words, punishment is administered 
without the expectation to alter an individuals’ behavior within a current exchange or direct 
future exchanges. The exploration into altruistic punishment is important as it demonstrates 
another exception to economic rational decision making.  If individuals are willing to suffer 
significant costs to punish others in exchange, it is a rational paradox.  
    Compared to typical use of punishment, ‘altruistic punishment’ is not administered 
during the on-going decisions associated with the public good. Rather it is administered after the 
interaction. In this sense the sanctioning is not being utilized to change the behavior of the free-
rider within the immediate context. This punishment can be termed ‘altruistic’ because it 
contains many of the features that are linked to altruistic behaviors. The punishment provides no 
benefit to the person performing the action, and the punishment is costly to administer.  Why 
might group members administer it then? One possibility may to extract revenge for free-riding 
on the contributions of others. Another possibility may be to demonstrate disapproval for free-
riding behaviors, in order to deter free-riding in the future.  Both of these motivations may 
contribute to the idea of upholding a norm of contributing to the group.  The importance of the 
group itself becomes highlighted in this context.  
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4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
    The fundamental question of concern is how characteristics of group interaction 
influence the administration of altruistic punishment. In particular, I investigate how group 
identity and the variability of group members’ past behavior influence individual decisions about 
administering punishment.  
    Previous research has examined group identity and similarities between group 
members as separate components impacting social dilemmas, but no research has addressed the 
interaction between these two situational characteristics.  
    Research by Shinada et al. (2004),  conceptualized university membership as a group 
identity, and they found that participants were less likely to altruistically punish free-riders when 
they were members of a rival university than when they were members of the same university. 
Irwin and Simpson (2013) have argued that when group members behave similarly, the behavior 
can generate social identity for group members.  Their interpretation is that conformity pressures 
arise when behaviors in groups are seen as similar.  In this way, high cooperation OR high 
defection (or free riding), if similar, can lead to group identity.   
    Research by Mussweiler and Ockenfels (2013) considers how similarity between two 
participants and group identity affect altruistic punishment.  When participants were primed to 
think of similarity vs. difference, they were more likely to altruistically punish. (Similarity and 
difference were primed by examining different pictures unrelated to the study itself.)  Also, they 
found that group identity (in terms of collegiate identity) did not increase altruistic punishment.  
Based on their results, they concluded that group identity does not produce the same sense of 
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similarity compared to more tangible similarities and thus is less influential on the administration 
of altruistic punishment because individuals are more lenient towards in-group than out-group 
members. This means that they are more likely to forgive in-group norm violation, as has been 
discussed elsewhere (Chen & Li, 2009; Bernard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006).  
    Mussweiler and Ockenfels thus proposed in-group identity might not be as strong or 
have the effects demonstrated in other studies. Rather, they argue that similarity might be more 
important component activated in the use of altruistic punishment.  However, their finding about 
the higher likelihood of altruistic punishment for outgroup member is counter to other research 
including Shinada et al., (2004) findings that individuals are more likely to punish individuals 
from their own in-group due to the perception that individuals in the in-group should contribute 
to the group well-being. 
    The discrepancies in research findings raise the question of exactly what theoretical 
properties of the public goods setting are important.  Part of the problem rests with 
conceptualizing strength of group identity and similarity.  Not all similarities and not all 
identities are equally important.  So, a theoretical challenge is definitional—how can group 
identity be conceptualized to address strength; how can similarity be defined in terms of 
behavioral consistency? 
    I suggest that in-group identity might vary dramatically depending upon what 
characteristics of common fate are activated.  It is easy to see, for example, that the group 
identity of survivors of a POW camp would be much higher than the group identity based on 
attendance at the same university.  It is also easy to see that contributions over time would be 
important to generate a history of similarity, and that history could vary with time. 
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    In this first test I propose to calibrate in-group identity by using an identity that has no 
connections with past behavior. If it is the case that we conceptualize altruistic punishment as a 
means to either demonstrate revenge or to demonstrate the importance of the group, then it 
follows that the importance of the group leads to differences in punishment.  Other things being 
equal, the greater the identification with the group, the more likely is altruistic punishment. If 
this is true then similarities in behavior and in-group identity should produce considerably high 
levels of altruistic punishment while activation of dissimilarities in behavior and out-group 
identity should provide considerably lower levels of altruistic punishment.  
    High variance in contributions to a public good will result in less altruistic punishment 
because it does not enable a group norm to develop.  So, punishment should be less likely as the 
norm is not clear. Comparatively, groups that have low variance in contributions will view low 
contributions as a violation of expectations of a group norm because of a unified pattern of 
contribution by all other group members. Irwin and Simpson also argue that similarities in 
behaviors produce a sense of in-group identity, while dissimilarities do not. Based on these 
findings the combination of similarities in behaviors in the form of contributions and the salience 
of an expressed in-group identity should produce the most administration of altruistic 
punishment compared to all other interactions of contribution variance and group identity.  
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5. STUDY DESIGN 
    An experimental study was utilized for this investigation so that the impact of different 
factors could be separated or controlled.  The study is not meant to directly generalize to public 
goods settings outside of the laboratory.  Rather, the experiment enables the test of the theoretical 
principles that then can be applied to other settings.  In this way, knowledge of principles can 
help us understand, and perhaps modify settings in which people might sacrifice for the benefit 
of others. 
    The study was designed to determine how group identity and similarity in 
contributions contribute to group members’ willingness to engage in altruistic punishment.  To 
examine the effects of each factor separately and together, I designed a 3 (In Group, Out Group, 
No Group Identity) by 2 (Low Variation In Contributions, High Variation In Contributions) 
factorial.  
5.1 Recruitment 
    Undergraduate students were recruited from introductory level social science classes at 
Texas A&M University. At the time of recruitment, students were asked to provide contact 
information and to signup for the SONA recruitment system to schedule participation in studies 
conducted by the Social Psychology Lab. They were also asked to self-identify themselves in 
terms of race/ethnicity and to select a preference for one of two pictures; one by the artist Paul 
Klee, and one by the artist Wassily Kandinsky.  The preference is often used in experimental 
studies to create groups that have no other “social” meaning (see Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig and 
Tajfel, 1973; Oakes and Turner, 1980).  
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Participants were scheduled in groups based their availability and randomly placed in one 
of the 6 possible conditions. There were at least 30 individuals in each of the 6 possible 
conditions. Group identity was determined by participants preference for Klee or Kandinsky in 
relation to other members of their group.  
5.2 Procedures 
    Participants arrived to participate in the study prior to the beginning of the study. 
Participants entered the lab at their scheduled date and time and were informed that they are 
going to do a task related to artistic preferences and decision making. They were informed that 
they would be working with 4 other individuals that may be in the lab or may be in another part 
of the building (The 4 other individuals were all actually computerized group members). The 
individuals were then given instructions on how to play an online public goods game with the 4 
other individuals in their group. Each participant was the only active member in the group and all 
other group members were simulated such that it appeared to the participant that others are 
making particular decisions. The computer program Z-tree formulated the contributions of the 
simulated group members based on the contributions of the participant and the specific 
experimental condition of high variation or low variation. In all conditions, participants were 
informed that they were ‘Group Member 3’ in the group of five and would be making decisions 
about how many tokens to invest to a group fund. After making the decision of investing, 
participants were shown both their own contributions and earnings for that round and the 
computer generated contributions and earnings of the other fictitious group members for each 
round. Within this display of information, participants also saw each group members selected 
picture preference of either Klee and Kandinsky. This preference was displaced each round along 
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with the group members contribution for the round. Participants in the in-group conditions saw 
that all group members had the same picture choice as they had. Participants in the out-group 
condition saw that all other group members had a different picture choice from them. Participants 
in the no identity condition saw no information about picture preference and were not told that 
they were involved in a study about artistic preference. They were told the study about simply 
about group decision making. Variation between participant contribution was manipulated 
through Z-tree. Participants in the low variation condition saw that ‘Group Member 1’ 
contributed 0 or 5 token each round and all other computerized group members’ contributions 
varied between 1 to 5 tokens from the participant's contribution each round. Participants in the 
high variation conditions saw that ‘Group Member 1’ contributed each round and all other 
computerized group members’ contribution varied between 10-15, 15-20, and 20-25 tokens from 
the participant’s contribution each round. Conditions 1-6 were designed based on the 
combination of information regarding group identity and variation in contributions. The 
conditions were designed as follows: 
Condition 1 consisted of participants seeing no information on group identity and seeing 
that there was low variation between their contributions and most computerized group members.  
Condition 2 consisted of participants seeing no information on group identity and seeing 
that there was high variation between themselves and most computerized group members. 
Condition 3 consisted of participants seeing that all members of the group shared the 
same identity in terms of visual preference and seeing that there was low variation between 
themselves and most computerized group members. 
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Condition 4 consisted of participants seeing that all other members of the group shared 
different identities from them in terms of visual preference and seeing that there was low 
variation between themselves and most computerized group members. 
Condition 5 consisted of participants seeing that all members of the group shared the 
same identity in terms of visual preference and seeing that there was high variation between 
themselves and most computerized group members. 
Condition 6 consisted of participants seeing that all other members of the group shared 
different identities from them in terms of visual preference and seeing that there was high 
variation between themselves and most computerized group members. 
Participants made 7 total decisions using Z-Tree, 3 example decisions to familiarize the 
participants to the interface and 4 decisions of contributions. After the final round of investments, 
participants were shown the total number of tokens invested by each group member, as well as 
each group member’s total earnings and each group member's’ contribution for each round. The 
information of picture preference accompanied this information regarding contributions, total 
contributions, and total earnings. While viewing this information participants were asked if they 
would like to reduce the total earnings from any of the other group members. For each token the 
participant was willing to contribute towards reducing another group member’s earnings, 5 
tokens was subtracted from the sanctioned group members total earnings. (For example, a player 
may have choose to spend 2 tokens to decrease another group member’s total earning by 10 or 
spend 5 tokens to decrease another group member’s total earning by 25). Participants were 
informed that each group member will decide from a range of ‘zero to their total earning’, how 
many tokens to contribute towards reducing each group member’s total earnings. After making 
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this decision, the total earnings for each participant were recalculated taking into account the 
sanctions and costs to sanction, the participants filled out a questionnaire (serving as a 
manipulations check) and were informed of their final earnings for the study. Upon completion 
of the study participants were debriefed, paid a standard fee of $20, and thanked for their time. 
The total time to complete the study was 60 minutes.  
5.3 Scope conditions 
To test my theoretical assertions, the following conditions must be met by the 
experimental setting: 
    1. Participants must believe that they are participating with four other actual         
group members. 
    2. Participants must have a recognized group identity based artistic preferences (unless 
there is no information about the preference). 
    3. Participants have information about the variance of past contributions among group 
members.  
    4. Ceteris Paribus. 
5.4 Independent Variables 
There are two independent variables: Group identity (in-group identity, out-group 
identity, no group identity) and contribution variance (high variance and low variance). 
Participants will randomly assigned to one of six conditions pairing group identity and 
contribution variance, creating a 3x2 experimental design. 
Participants in the in-group identity conditions visually saw that all other group members 
selected the same picture preference as them in terms of Klee or Kandinsky. Participants in the 
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out-group identity conditions visually saw that all other group members selected the alternative 
choice to their selected picture preference of Klee or Kandinsky. Participants in the no group 
identity did not see any images of picture preference but simply saw the group number of each 
individual. Picture preference was displayed whenever participants made decisions.   
Participants in the high variance conditions saw that the investments from three other 
members randomly vary ranging from + or - 35 from their investment. In addition, one 
computerized group member alternated between invested 0 and 5 tokens across the 4 rounds, 
thus serving as a free rider. Participants in the low variance condition saw that the investments 
from three members did not significantly vary from the participants investments. If a 
participant’s investment was X, three other participants’ investments were randomly chosen with 
a range of + or - 5 from X each round. In addition, one group member invested 0 in both rounds, 
serving as a free rider.  
5.5 Dependent Variables 
The number of tokens participants were willing to contribute towards reducing other 
group members total earnings was the measure of altruistic punishment. This is the primary 
dependent variable.  In the questionnaire that follows the task, participants were asked the reason 
why they decided to reduce another group member’s earnings, if applicable. Additionally, there 
were questions asking how group members felt about the their own group.  
5.6 Hypothesis  
    My hypothesis is that there the amount of altruistic punishment will vary based on the 
combination of information regarding group identity and contribution variance: all else equal, the 
most altruistic punishment will be administered under conditions of in-group identity and low 
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contribution variance (P1); followed by low contribution variance with no group identity (P2); 
followed by low contribution variance with out-group identity (P3); followed by high 
contribution variance with in-group identity (P4); followed by high contribution variance with 
no-group identity (P5); and the condition of high contribution variance with out-group identity 
(P6) is predicted to draw the least amount of altruistic punishment.  
(P1) > (P2) > (P3) > (P4) > (P5) > (P6) 
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6. RESULTS 
6.1 Demographic Information 
The participants consisted of 55 Males (33%) and 111 Females (67%) sampled from the 
undergraduate population at Texas A&M University. The average age for participants was 19 
years old. The racial/ethnic composition of the sample was 53 Latinx (32%), 9 Blacks (5%), 15 
Asians (9%) , 1 International (1%), 12 Others (7%), and 76 Whites (46%). 53 participants 
selected Kandinsky for their artistic preference, 49 participants selected Klee for their artistic 
preference.  
6.2 Manipulation Checks 
To assess contribution variations, all participants were asked to state whether they 
believed that the majority of the group's contributions each round showed high variability or low 
variability. Any participants whose answers did not match the condition they were assigned to 
were not included in the analysis, as they did not meet the criteria of the manipulation. 35 total 
participants were excluded on this basis.  The number of participants who correctly answered the 
variance question by condition is provided in the Appendix. Suspicions about the experiment 
were assessed based upon the responses in the post experimental questionnaire.  If any 
participant voiced suspicions about the study, he or she was excluded.  On this basis, 23 
participants were dropped from analysis.  
6.3 Findings 
Table A1 within the Appendix demonstrates how altruistic punishment was administered 
across the six conditions. At the end of the study, participants completed a questionnaire that 
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asked multiple questions to assess their level of group identity with the other group members. 
One set of four questions consisted of statements about how participants felt about the group 
with the following pairs (Distant-Close; Coming Apart-Coming Together; Fragile-Solid; 
Divisive-Cohesive; Diverging-Converging). A 9-point Likert scale was used to assess how 
participants felt about their groups. (9 being the highest regarded to the group). The average 
score and stand deviation on these four questions are displayed in Table A2 within the Appendix.  
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with planned comparisons were used to see if there there 
was a relationship between the manipulated variables of identity (specifically ingroup vs. 
outgroup identity, with the no identity group removed from analysis) and contribution variance 
and the index on identity. An ANOVA showed that contribution variance was significantly 
related to average scores on the identity index (F=13.72, p<.05) and group identity was not 
significantly related to average scores on the identity index (F=0.78, p=0.38). Variance was also 
influential on group identity as suggested by Irwin and Simpson (2013), who have argued that 
when group members behave similarly, the behavior can generate social identity for group 
members.  Their interpretation is that conformity pressures arise when behaviors in groups are 
seen as similar.  
6.4 Analysis 
    Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with planned comparisons were used to test these 
hypotheses. The six means were compared, one from each condition of the study, with each 
condition consisting of a group of approximately thirty individuals. The scores were averaged by 
condition and compared between conditions. In addition, questionnaire answers will be analyzed 
to investigate reasons given for decision making regarding sanctioning group members. 
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To test these hypotheses, I used the number of tokens participants are willing to 
contribute towards reducing other group members total earnings as altruistic punishment. If 
group identity and contribution similarity interacted to impact the administration of altruistic 
punishment as hypothesized, there would be a statistically significant difference in punishment 
being administered and the extent of punishment across the six conditions within the study. 
Specifically as hypothesized, not only will there be a statistically significant difference between 
in punishment across conditions, but there will also be a distinct pattern in terms of which 
conditions produce the most punishment and which conditions produce the least punishment.  
Results from a 3 (no group vs. in group vs. out group identity) x 2 (high vs. low contribution 
variance) analysis of variance (ANOVA) did not show a main effect of group identity or 
contribution variance on punishment. There were no statistically significant difference between 
groups as determined by the ANOVA. Table A3 in the Appendix demonstrates the results of an 
ANOVA for the effect of identity and contribution variance on altruistic punishment.  
An additional analysis of variance including sex as a variable of influence showed that 
sex was in fact related to sanctioning non-contributors. This is demonstrated in Table A4 within 
the Appendix. Specifically a t-test showed that although males were found to administer more 
sanctioning on average compared to females, the impact significant at the .06 level. This is 
demonstrated in Table A5 within the Appendix. 
To further explore the relationships, I conducted analysis of the contributions of group 
members. A linear regression showed that total numbers of tokens contributed to the group fund 
was statistically significant in relation to sanctioning, while variance, identity, sex, race, and the 
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interaction between sex and total number of tokens contributed to the group fund were not 
statistically significant. Table A6 in the Appendix demonstrates these results. 
Although I did not specifically hypothesize the effects of contributions, it is important for 
understanding the dynamics of the interaction.  The ANOVA in Table A7 in the Appendix 
demonstrate a significant effect of contributions based on the variance of others’ contributions.  
Table A8 in the Appendix shows that individuals contributed more in the the low variance 
condition compared to the high variance condition. As observed in Table A9 located in the 
Appendix, there is also a significant effect of sex on contributions. Specifically males contribute 
more total tokens on average compared to females and individuals contributed more when 
contributions were similar.  
To further explore these relationships, I conduct a mediation analysis. I examine the 
relationship between Sex and Variance on Contributions and then examine the effects of 
Contributions on Altruistic Punishment. For Sex, a Sobel-Goodman mediation analysis showed 
that Males administered more altruistic punishment than Females (c= -21.84, t=-2.07, p < .05),  
and Males contributed more in the study than Females (a= -46.51, t=-2.73, p<.05). Further, when 
Sex and Contributions are included in the same model, 13% of the effect of Sex on Altruistic 
Punishment is mediated by Contributions, which is statistically significant (b = .13, t=2.85, p < .
05) and Sex has no direct effect on Altruistic Punishment (c’= -15.59, t=-1.47, p=.14).  
For contribution Variance, a Sobel-Goodman mediation analysis showed that although 
participants in the Low Variance condition administered more Altruistic Punishment than 
participants in the High Variance condition, the findings was not statistically significant (c= 
-13.17, t=-1.31, p=.19).  Participants in the Low Variance condition contributed significantly 
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more in the study than participants in the High Variance condition (a= -42.75, t=-2.66, p<.05). 
Further, when Contribution Variance and Contributions are included in the same model, 
Contribution has a significant effect on Altruistic Punishment (b = .14, t=2.99, p < .05) and 
Variance still has no direct effect on Altruistic punishment (c’= -7.10, t=-0.44, p=.48). 
Contribution does not mediate the relationship between Contribution Variance and Altruistic 
punishment because the relationship between Contribution Variance and Altruistic punishment is 
not significant. However, there is a clear and significant relationship between Contribution 
Variance and Contributions, as well as between Contributions and Altruistic Punishment. Figures 
A1-A3 in the Appendix illustrate the relationships between these variables.  
Lastly, participants were asked whether or not they reduced another group member’s total 
with four closed-ended options listed in the Appendix. Participants could select multiple options 
and well as an additional text box option for an open ended response. Open ended responses 
were coded according to themes.  Table A10 displays decisions to punish and reasons based on 
sex. 
!  32
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary  
 The experimental test does not support my hypotheses in regards to the direct effects of 
group identity and variance of others’ contributions on altruistic punishment. Based on previous 
research I hypothesized that in-group identity and low contribution variance would interact to 
produce the highest amount of altruistic punishment and that out-group identity and high 
contribution variance would interact to produce the least amount of altruistic punishment. 
However, the data reveals that there was no statistically significant difference in the amount of 
altruistic punishment that was administered based on the interaction of these characteristics of 
the setting. While not significantly different, the most altruistic punishment was administered in 
the out-group, low variance condition (1581 tokens) and the least amount of altruistic 
punishment was administered in the no group identity, high variance condition (451 tokens).  
While there is a large difference between these conditions, the large degree of variance within 
each condition does not allow us to conclude they were significantly different (p=.22). 
Given that the predictions were not supported, I must consider plausible alternative reasons for 
the results.  In any experimental design, the first consideration is always the design itself.  That 
is, can we be sure that participants: understood the study; understood the variance on 
contributions; and, understood the identity of self and others? We can be confident that the 
experimental design was sound. Artistic Preference was always on the screen where participants’ 
made decisions. Additionally, if participants did not understand the general dispersion of the 
variance of contributions, they were excluded from the data as this constitutes a violation of 
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scope conditions.  We ensured that participants understood instructions by presenting them both 
in written and verbal form; further participants had practice sessions in which they could see how 
the process worked. 
 Since these predictions were not supported (with the experimental manipulations being 
sound as indicated through the manipulation checks), it could mean that the administration of 
altruistic punishment is impacted by these characteristics in ways other than what is predicted by 
previous literature. Group identity is a difficult factor to create, in part because it has so many 
variations. This experimental design carefully controlled for the identity, but although people 
understood what group they were in, it did not have a strong effect on their behavior.  This effect 
of group identity might be very different for different identities, especially those based on past 
experience or common fate (see Sell and Love 2009).  
  Contribution variance also did not have a direct effect on punishment. It did, however, 
have an effect on contributions, with those in the low variance conditions contributing more than 
those in high variance conditions. And contributions, importantly had a significant effect on 
punishment: those that contributed more, also punished more.  But, it is also the case that men 
contributed more and consequently punished more. 
 An unexpected finding from the research showed that sex was a statistically significant in 
influencing decision to contribute to the public good. Specifically men contributed more than 
women throughout the study. An important caveat for this finding is that there were more women 
who participated in the research compared to men (111 vs. 55). While individuals did not 
actually interact with other group members within the decision making process of the research 
study, they participated in the research in the same room with other individuals and were made to 
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believe that the group members that were interacting with were either present in the room or in 
another room within the building. This means that in each individual research session that was 
run, the men were typically outnumbered by the number of women in the room.  This becomes 
important because it is likely that sex was activated as a diffuse status characteristic and as such 
men assumed a more powerful position.  As indicated by Sell (1997), when men and women are 
interacting in mixed sex groups, men tend to contribute more in an effort to influence women in 
particular.  Women, due to their low state of the diffuse status characteristic are not so affected; 
they do not believe they can be as influential. Individuals with high status characteristics feel that 
they can affect the rest of the group. This further could explain why men contributed more, 
which then led to altruistic punishment. It could be suggested that that men are more vengeful as 
a reason for the discrepancy in the administering of punishment, but this implication is not 
supported by two important points. First, men contributed more and second, questionnaire items 
showed that revenge was not a common motivational reason for administering punishment for 
any participants (male or female).  
 Further investigating the relationship between contributions and sanctioning showed that 
both variance and sex were statistically significant in influencing the total contributions by 
participants and that total number of contributions statistically significant to sanctioning non-
contributors. Specifically, men were more likely to contribute to the group. And contributions are 
more likely to be high when when the contribution variance was low.  
 Additionally, as total contributions to the group increased, amount of sanctioning 
administered increased as well.  Mediation analysis demonstrates complete mediation between 
the relationship of sex on sanctioning. Sex and variance of behavior both significantly impact 
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contributions which influences sanctioning, however variance have no direct effect on 
sanctioning and when total contributions are controlled for, sex has no direct effect on 
sanctioning. 
7.2 Conclusion 
 This research contributes to the existing literature regarding group identity, contribution 
variance, and altruistic punishment in terms of their interactional influence. The hypothesized 
relationships among variance of contributions and group identity, and altruistic punishment were 
not supported. However, the research does provides a better understanding of when altruistic 
punishment might occur.    This research attempted to arbitrate among different findings about 
altruistic punishment. This research lends some support for previous research by Mussweiler and 
Ockenfels (2013) which suggested that group identity was not a significant factor in influencing 
altruistic punishment and that individuals are more likely to administer punishment based on 
‘pure’ similarity rather than differences. Mussweiler operationalized similarity as cognitive focus 
on similarities. This research suggests that the most important similarity is the similarity of high 
contributions to the group fund. In accordance, Mussweiler and Ockenfels found that a group 
members level of cooperation was more severely punished if the punisher cooperated more in the 
interaction. This finding was supported through this current research. A major methodological 
difference between the two studies was that the previous study involved a two-person, single, 
simultaneous decision constituting a group interaction. In the current study  a group interaction is 
operationalized by a multi-person, repeated, simultaneous decisions.  
The major contribution of the paper is the “uncovering” of mechanisms involved in group 
members’ decisions to punish other groups members, even when that punishment disadvantages 
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the punisher. The key seems to be how much a particular group member contributes to the group.  
This is affected by the sex of the punisher (or the status of the punisher vis a vis others in the 
group) and the variance of others contributions.  When contributions were high, and others’ 
contributions were thus relatively high, group members’ were more likely to give up individual 
resources to punish the non-contributor. This would be in line with the idea of administering 
altruistic punishment being considered a secondary contribution to a public good. Individuals 
who are more willing to make a primary contribution are more likely to make a secondary 
contribution in the form of sanctioning . The very acts of contribution creates a sense of common 
fate and this most likely creates a sense of inequity directed toward the non-contributor to “free 
ride” off others within the group.  The common responses of participants supports this 
interpretation.  The most common reasons for punishing a non-contributor was not revenge per 
se, but rather “anger” about the free-riding or as an act to equalize outcomes. 
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APPENDIX 
1. The number of participants who correctly answered the variance question: Condition1- 
N=30/38, Condition2- N=31/36 Condition3- N=31/37 Condition4 -N=31/36 Condition5- 
N=32/40 Condition6- N=30/33 
Table A1. Administration Of Altruistic Punishment  
Table A2. Average Answer on Post-experiment Survey Question On Group Identity  
Cronbach alpha = .90 
Condition 1 
(NoID-LoVar)
Condition 2 
(NoID-HiVar)
Condition 3 
(InID-LoVar)
Condition 4 
(InID-HiVar)
Condition 5 
(OutID-LoVar)
Condition 6 
(OutID-HiVar)
Punish 
Admin
N=16/27 
(55%) 
N=11/27 
(41%) 
N=14/27 
(52%) 
N=12/28 
(43%) 
N=15/29 
(52%) 
N=12/28 
(43%) 
Total 906 438 652 583 1187 631
Avg./N 33.48 16.22 24.15 20.82 40.93 22.54
Avg./Pun 56.63 39.82 46.57 48.58 79.13 52.58
Condition1  
(NoID-LoVar) 
N=27
Condition2 
(NoID-HiVar) 
N=27
Condition3 
(InID-LoVar) 
N=27
Condition4 
(InID-HiVar) 
N=28
Condition5 
(OutID-LowVar) 
N=29
Condition6 
(OutID-HiVar) 
N=28
3.96 (sd=1.85) 4.12 (sd=1.57) 5.24 (sd=1.75) 3.92 (sd=1.07) 4.79 (sd=2.02) 3.83 (sd=1.37)
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TABLE A3. ANOVA for the Effects of Identity and Contribution Variance on Altruistic 
Punishment 
Number of obs = 166             R-squared = 0.017 
Root MSE = 65.1866              Adj R-squared = -0.0138 
TABLE A4. ANOVA for the Effects of Identity and Contribution Variance and Sex on Altruistic 
Punishment 
Number of obs = 166             R-squared = 0.0378 
Root MSE = 64.696              Adj R-squared = 0.0014 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob>F
Model 11727.802 5 2345.5603 0.55 0.7366
Identity 2586.6768 2 1293.3384 0.30 0.7380
Variance 7028.4076 1 7028.4076 1.65 0.2003
Identity*Variance 6072.4721 2 3036.236 0.23 0.7948
Residual 679887.67 160 4249.298
Total 691615.48 165 4191.6089
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob>F
Model 26108.737 6 4351.4562 1.04 0.4017
Identity 1565.9891 2 782.99454 0.19 0.8296
Variance 4362.3791 1 4362.3791 1.04 0.3089
Identity*Variance 2516.0866 2 3036.236 0.23 0.7948
Sex 14380.936 1 14380.936 3.44 0.0656
Residual 665506.74 159 4185.577
Total 691615.48 165 4191.6089
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TABLE A5. t-test for the Effect of Sex on Altruistic Punishment 
t = 1.87, df(86), Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0637 
TABLE A6. Linear regression for the effects of Identity, Contribution Variance, Contribution 
Total, Sex, Race and the interaction between Sex and Contribution Total on Altruistic 
Punishment 
*** = p < .05 
N=166, F(6, 159) = 2.57, Prob>F = 0.021; R2 = 0.09, Adj R2 = 0.054 Root MS = 62.97 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Male 55 41.09 10.28 76.24 20.48 61.70
Female 111 19.25 5.43 57.22 8.49 30.02
Combined 166 26.49 5.03 64.74 16.57 36.41
Diff 21.83 11.63 -1.27 44.95
Sanction1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
Variance -5.98 10.04 -0.60 0.552 -25.81 13.84
Identity 2.44 6.02 0.40 0.686 -9.44 13.84
ConTotal 0.22 0.08 2.77 0.006*** 0.06 0.38
Sex 16.52 23.90 0.70 0.484 -30.44 63.97
Race -1.46 3.14 -0.46 0.643 -7.65 4.74
Sex*ConTot -0.15 1.00 -1.48 0.141 -0.34 0.05
_cons -4.05 29.10 -0.14 0.889 -61.53 53.42
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TABLE A7. ANOVA for the Effects of Identity, Contribution Variance, and Sex on Contributions 
Number of obs = 166             R-squared = 0.0787 
Root MSE = 103.426              Adj R-squared = 0.0379 
*** = p < .05 
Table A8. t-test for the Effect of Contribution Variance on Overall Contributions 
t = 2.66, df(164), Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.009***; *** = p < .05 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob>F
Model 144389.37 7 20627.052 1.93 0.068
Identity 4442.6751 2 2221.3376 0.21 0.8127
Variance 51093.996 1 51093.996 4.78 0.0303
Identity*Variance 3833.0402 2 1916.5201 0.18 0.8361
Sex 53883.373 1 53883.373 5.04 0.0262***
Sex*Variance 40.478 1 40.478 0.00 0.951
Residual 1690104.2 158 10696.862
Total 1834493.6 165 11118.143
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Low Var 83 221.253 12.16 110.75 197.07 245.44
High Var 83 178.506 10.52 95.82 157.58 199.43
Combined 166 199.88 8.18 105.44 183.73 216.04
Diff 42.75 16.07 11.00 74.49
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TABLE A9. t-tests for the Effect of Sex on Overall Contributions 
t = 2.67, df(102), Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0088; *** = p < .05 
Table A10. Decisions to punish and reasons based on sex. 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Male 55 230.98 14.50 107.56 201.90 260.06
Female 111 184.49 9.62 101.36 165.40 203.54
Combined 166 199.88 8.18 105.44 183.72 216.04
Diff 46.51 17.40 11.99 81.03
Males Females
1. I decided to reduce a group member's total because I was angry about lack of 
contributions to the group fund
12 10
2. I decided to reduce a group member's total because I wanted to exact revenge 1 2
3. I decided to reduce a group member's total because I wanted group totals to be 
more equal among all group members
4 19
Combination of 1 and 2 3 4
Combination of 1 and 3 6 7
Combination of 2 and 3 0 2
Combination of 1, 2, and 3 4 4
Written in reasons for reducing a group member’s total: “My total was 11.66 and I 
wanted to round it down to a "0" so I just spent six tokens because it looks better 
to me” 
0 1
Written in reasons for reducing a group member’s total: “i decide to take away the 
same amount from each group member because i felt as if it was someone else 
doing the reduction, they wouldve took my tokens away”
0 1
Total Individuals who decided to reduce others total earning = 30 50
Total Individual who decided not to reduce others total earnings = 24 57
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Figure A1. Observed Relationship Between Variance, Sex, Contributions and Altruistic 
Punishment 
 
Variance 
 
Contributions Altruistic Punishment  
Sex  
Figure A2. Mediation Effects of Sex on Punishment Through Contributions (Complete 
mediation) 
   Sex   c = -28.74***   Altruistic Punishment 
  
     
        Contributions 
      
         a = - 46.51***   b = .13*** 
  
       c’ = -15.59***    
     
   Sex Altruistic Punishment 
   
Figure A3. Relationship between Contribution Variance Contributions and Altruistic Punishment 
(no mediation)  
                      Contribution Variance   c = -28.74   Altruistic Punishment 
  
     
        Contributions 
      
         a = - 42.75***   b = .14*** 
  
       c’ = -7.10    
     
                    Contribution Variance Altruistic Punishment 
  
!  50
